1. About the First Conclusion

a. Proof of the First Conclusion by Others

66. The first conclusion is proved as follows [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.21 princ.4 q.1]:

“The same person can, when speaking in the person of another, truly affirm something that he would truly deny speaking in his own person (proof: the angel speaking to Moses in the person of God truly said, ‘I am the Lord your God     etc .’, Exodus 20.2, which he would have truly denied speaking in his own person). Therefore     , by similarity a man when representing the person of God in the forum of confession can truly affirm something that he can truly deny outside that forum when speaking in his own person.     Therefore , when saying outside the forum that he had heard or knows those things, he is lying, because they only came to his knowledge insofar he was representing the person of God. But to avoid a lie belongs to the right of nature, and especially a pernicious lie; therefore etc     .” b. Refutation of the Aforesaid Proof

b. Refutation of the Aforesaid Proof

67. Against this reasoning it can be argued:

First as follows, that it belongs to the same person, and as the same person, to take cognizance in a case and to give sentence in it (this is manifest because it is this person and as this person who is for this purpose taking cognizance). But a priest does not give sentence in God’s person but in his own when absolving a confessing penitent; therefore as such does he hear and take cognizance. Proof of the minor: a priest does not absolve principally but ministerially; but to absolve ministerially only belongs to him in his own person. For if he were to speak in the person of God when absolving a confessing penitent he could, without preceding prayer (which is “May the Lord absolve you”), say “I absolve you principally and I infuse grace into you,” as the angel truly said in the person of God, “I brought you out of the land of Egypt” [Exodus 20.2].

68. Again, in the forum of confession a priest does not hear or absolve in the person of God more than he confects the Eucharist in the person of God, because the former act is excellent just as the latter is and a sacramental act where divine virtue operates as here. Indeed, the priest seems to act more in the person of God or in the person of Christ in the latter than the former; for in the latter he speaks the words of Christ ‘my body’ and in the person of Christ, about which words he prefaces, “Who on the day before he died etc.,” such that he himself says the whole of “Take etc.” and “this is etc.,” by reciting the words of Christ. It is not so in the issue at hand. Hence the priest does not preface in confession “Christ, wishing to absolve the sinner, spoke thus, ‘I absolve you’,” but the ‘I’ stands here for the person of the minister himself. From this is it plain that the priest confects in the person of Christ more not less than he absolves or hears confession. But he confects in his own person, and what he knows as confecting he knows in his own person; hence he does not lie when after mass he says, “I know that I consecrated today.” Therefore in confession too.

69. Again, to speak of sins uncovered in confession, albeit universally and not referred in particular to the person confessing, is to speak according to the same way and according to the same truth [n.68], as will be proved later [n.97].

70. This is also proved by Gregory IX, Decretals V tit.38 ch.9, ‘On Penitences and Remissions’, where Innocent III responds to a certain cardinal legate who had written to him of a case he had heard in confession and sought his advice. The Pope did not refute him as to the revelation in general, in writing too, but replies how one should advise such a person confessing.

71. This is also plain from the common practice of confessors for, whether in common speech or in preaching, they sometimes say, “Such a case occurred,” “Someone sinned in such or such a way.” The proposition, therefore, is obtained that a confessor can licitly state outside confession a sin confessed to him, but so that he in no way state something related to the person confessing from which knowledge of him could be reached.

72. But if the aforesaid reasoning [of Richard, n.66] were valid this would not be licit, because the confessor would be lying. Proof: because he who does not know a particular save as a determinate singular does not know the particular if he not know the singular; but this confessor does not know that some person has done such a sin save as this person confessed by him and as this sin confessed to him; therefore if he would be lying about this person and this sin because ignorant of them [sc. outside confession], he would be lying similarly about other person and other sin.Richard claims [n.66] that a confessor who says outside confession what he knows in confession would be lying, since he does not know it outside confession. Scotus counters that this claim entails confessors would be lying if outside confession they speak, as they do [n.71], of such and such sin and sinner without mentioning singular instances. For confessors only know such cases because they know the singular instances; so if they do not know the singular instances outside confession, neither do they know the cases outside confession and would be lying if they said they did. ⁶²

73. I concede, therefore, these arguments [nn.67-72], for it is not because a revealer may be lyingThe Latin text misprints ‘mentiarur’ for ‘mentiatur’. ⁶³ that revelation [of confession] is against the law of nature. And so I do not hold this first argument [n.66].

74. I reply to the argument, therefore, that it is not the same thing to speak in the person of another and to speak with his authority or as his minister. For commonly he who speaks in the person of another simply projects the person, as is commonly the case in those who jokingly imitate others. For when he imitates the stutterer or the like in a like act, and does so by talking as he would talk, it is in his person that he is speaking or doing what he does; and therefore as soon as he fails to act as that person would and to talk as he would it is said to him ‘You are lying’ or ‘you are doing it wrong’, although then he is acting or speaking in his own proper voice. This is how it is with the speakings of angels in the person of God [n.66].

75. Not thus does a priest hear confession or absolve in the person of God, but he is only a minister of God in the act and as a minister he acts; therefore he acts in his own person.

76. I concede, therefore, that if he were to hear in the person of God and to speak in the person of God, he could say something truly that he could not say in his own person; for in the person of God he would truly say this, ‘I am God’, ‘I created the world’, and the like; but speaking so in his own person he would lie. But the priest in confession neither hears nor speaks in the person of God but in his own person, although with the authority of God and as his minister. The same way in other sacraments. Hence as minister of God he baptizes and consecrates, and yet as man or in his own person he knows that he has baptized, and he can say without lying that he has baptized.

c. Scotus’ own Reasons for the First Conclusion

77. I maintain the first conclusion [n.65], therefore.

78. But I set down four other reasons, the first of which is taken from the idea of charity, the second from the idea of fidelity, the third from the idea of truth, the fourth from the idea of unity or mutual utility.

79. The first is of this sort: the law of nature about fraternal charity is expressed in Matthew 7.12, “Everything that you want men to do to you, do it to them; for this is the law and the prophets,” and Luke 6.31, “As you want men to do to you, do you also to them.” The proposition of natural law about fraternal charity must be understood in like way: “What you want for yourself,” that is, what you should want according to right reason, and this is understood in the proposition of Matthew 22.39, “Love your neighbor as yourself.” But each should according to right reason love his own reputation,     therefore love also the hiding of his confessed sin; and consequently the confessor should love and want the same thing for him who has confessed. But revelation [of his confessed sin] would take from him his reputation. Therefore etc     .

80. Proof of the major:

From Scripture, Ecclesiasticus 41.15, “Have care for your good name,” and it gives a reason for this, “For this will be more lasting for you than a thousand great and precious treasures.” It proves it too by something else it adds, “There is a number of days for a good life; but a good name will last forever.” And Proverbs 22.1, “Better is a good name than much riches.”

81. Again, this is proved by reason: for everyone should according to right reason want civil life for himself; but this is taken away by the removal of reputation, because one lives with civil life in this, that one is fit for the legitimate acts that belong to oneself in that civil existence; but when reputation is lost one is deprived of one’s fitness for such acts, because one has lost the status of undamaged dignity, that is, fitness for the acts that one would otherwise be worthy of.

82. The second part of the minor, namely that the revealing of confessed sin takes this sort of reputation from him who has confessed [n.79], is proved by the fact that a reason whereby it can be revealed to one is a reason whereby it can be revealed to another, and so to everyone; but in such revealing it is manifest that the status of undamaged reputation (which consists in his reputation among fellow citizens) is taken from him.

83. The second reason: everyone is by the law of nature bound to keep with his neighbor the fidelity he wants and should want to keep with himself; but he who commits to another a very great secret wants and should want it to be kept secret; therefore another to whom he has committed it is bound to keep it for him. This reason is touched on in Proverbs 11.13. “He who walks deceitfully reveals secrets; but he who is faithful hides what a friend has done.”

84. The third reason: everyone is bound by the law of nature to keep a lawful promise; but he who receives a secret, especially what is uncovered in confession, promises, if not explicitly yet implicitly, that he will keep it, because without such a promise, at least implicitly understood, such a secret would not be committed to him;     therefore etc     . This reason can be taken from the remark, “Speak ye truth everyone with his neighbor” [Zechariah 8.16, Ephesians 4.25].

85. The fourth reason: any community has a unity proportionate in this to the unity of the body of Christ, that there is an order there of superior and inferior; and the superior is bound to exercise influence over the inferior, and the inferior is bound to minister to the superior, according to the parable of St. Paul about the mystical body of Christ in diverse places [Romans 12.4-5, I Corinthians 6.15-20, 12.4-7, Colossians 1.18]. But in civil society the inferior is less sufficient to himself and less knowing, and in the Church the sinner is unknowing but the superior is a hierarch who is able both to advise and to reconcile. Therefore, it is of the law of nature that no one exclude the inferior from recourse to a superior in necessities, nor exclude the superior from influence over an inferior, because this is a the common utility of the members with each other. But the revealing of a secret excludes the inferior from such recourse to a superior in advice of soul, and consequently excludes the superior from influence over the inferior; because no one would have recourse if that about which he asks advice or remedy did not regularly have to be kept secret; therefore the superior is bound to hide this secret by the same law of nature by which anyone is bound to keep the unity of the mystical body of Christ, and bound to keep the common utility of others as the members do in the body.